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that is normally considered proprietary — information that
might give internally developed software a competitive edge.
Finally, the proposed decree contains stringent enforce-
ment provisions. It creates an independent three-person
technical committee with broad, on-site review powers. It
requires Microsoft to offer uniform license terms to the 20
largest computer manufacturers, thereby preventing the
company from sidestepping other provisions of the settle-
ment through discounts and promotional deals. It gives the
government authority to seek criminal and civil contempt
sanctions in the event that Microsoft violates the accord.
And it grants the court the discretion to extend the five-year
term of the order by two years if Microsoft breaks the rules. 
CONCLUSION
In the end, both Microsoft and the government made con-
cessions in order to reach a compromise because they real-
ized that there are costs and risks to continuing litigation. Find-
ing that such a compromise serves the public interest does not
require a complete re-hashing of the original charges and argu-
ments made in United States v. Microsoft. In fact, one need not
take a stand on the merits of the original case at all. A far bet-
ter approach is to review the record as it stands today, taking
into account the appeals court decision and the uncertain-
ty created by the fact that the remaining proceedings will be
conducted before a new district court judge. Such a review
reveals that the proposed settlement is preferable to additional
litigation, and is in the public interest.
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Rationalizing Air Pollution Regulation 
By Randall Lutter
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies
T
he nation’s sputtering air pollu-
tion policies may soon receive a major over-
haul. On Valentine’s Day, President Bush pro-
posed that Congress mandate deep cuts in the
levels of sulfur dioxides (SO2), nitrogen oxides
(NOx), and mercury emitted by U.S. electric power plants.
Under the Bush “Clear Skies Initiative,” SO2emissions would
decrease from the current level of 11 million tons per year
to three million in 2018, NOx would fall from five million
tons to 1.7 million, and mercury from 48 tons to 15.
At the same time, the Bush administration supports
phasing out the New Source Review (nsr) program, at
least as it applies to facilities regulated by the new legisla-
tion. The program requires power plants, refineries, and
other facilities to gain advance approval from federal envi-
ronmental regulators that new investment projects and
maintenance procedures will meet stringent emissions
requirements. Though environmentalists and some mem-
bers of Congress laud nsr, the program has drawn criticism
because the costs and uncertainty of the lengthy approval
process encourage energy producers to operate outmoded,
minimally maintained plants instead of refurbishing them
with more efficient and more environmentally benign
equipment.
If lawmakers and the White House can resolve disagree-
ments over how to address greenhouse gas emissions, they
have an opportunity to forge a sensible compromise that
would enable the passage of new NOx, SO2, and mercury
caps while dumping nsr. But that process will not yield leg-
islation that can be implemented in an economically sound
manner unless Congress and the administration pay atten-
tion to a few basic economic issues.
STRINGENCY MATTERS 
The Environmental Protection Agency is still preparing esti-
mates of the benefits and costs of its proposed emissions
caps — information essential to evaluate their stringency.  Pre-
liminary reports suggest, however, that the agency’s analyt-
ic methods preclude identification of the best emissions
caps. First, the estimates are not expected to take into account
pending emissions cuts required by existing regulations.
States already must cut emissions to meet the stringent air
quality standards that epaissued in 1997, yet epa’s analysis
is likely to ignore the effects of the cuts, thereby overstating
the benefits of the new emissions caps. Second, epa’s analy-
sis is expected to include benefits from air cleaner than
required by the 1997 standards. Because epaclaims its stan-
dards are requisite to protect public health with an adequate
margin of safety, air quality improvements in areas that
would otherwise meet the standard should not be used to jus-
tify costly new emissions cuts. epa should provide an eco-
nomic analysis that takes proper account of pending air
quality improvements and discounts benefits that occur in
areas that comply with its air quality standards. After con-
sidering that more sound analysis, Congress should set caps
to maximize net benefits. 
Mercury  The benefits of reducing mercury emissions jus-
tify only very modest emissions caps. Research suggests that
a severe mercury cut, like the one proposed by Sen. James
Jeffords (I-Vt.) in legislation now before the Senate, would
produce very small gains in public health but would boost
electricity bills by more than a billion dollars per year.
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Granted, some epidemiological studies suggest that chil-
dren whose mothers ate very large quantities of mercury-
contaminated fish while pregnant may experience subtle neu-
rological problems. But very few women in the United States
eat fish in quantities where significant neurological problems
are of concern. Moreover, most contaminated fish consumed
in the United States are ocean species, like swordfish and tuna,
whose mercury levels are quite unlikely to respond to cuts in
U.S. emissions of mercury. Finally, there is no accepted esti-
mate of how mercury levels for fish caught in U.S. waters
would respond to reductions in power plants’ mercury emis-
sions. Mercury in U.S. waters comes from natural sources like
the earth’s crust, foreign sources,
and previously contaminated sed-
iment, and is largely determined
by a poorly understood process
that converts inorganic mercury
into the organic form that accu-
mulates in fish tissue. Thus, Con-
gress should mandate only a
modest mercury cap until there is
better evidence that deep cuts, like
the 90-percent reduction pro-
posed by Jeffords, would bring
about meaningful environmen-
tal or public health gains. 
PERMIT TRADING
Good legislation would include
a program patterned on the
much-acclaimed SO2emissions
trading program established by
the Clean Air Act Amendments
of  1990. The permit-trading 
program that epa administers
under Title IV of the act has
become a model because it
yielded emissions control costs and emissions that were
both lower than expected. However, lawmakers should be
careful to adopt a trading program that builds on the lessons
of the earlier SO2 program, and is not merely a cookie-
cutter copy. 
For instance, an emissions trading program should rec-
ognize regional differences in the damages from emissions
to help ensure that trading does not worsen environmental
protection. Congress should direct epato take into account
the broad regional differences in emissions’ damages when
designing emissions permit markets. For example, a permit
to emit 12 tons in the sparsely populated West, if traded to a
power plant in the densely populated East, might allow emis-
sions of only 10 tons because emissions in the East are more
damaging. The Bush proposal to create two separate region-
al markets for NOx emissions is an inadequate step in that
direction because it bans any trade between the two regions.
Second, an economically sensible trading program would
allow tradeoffs between pollutants with similar effects. All leg-
islative proposals to date specify maximum levels of emissions
for NOx and SO2, as if air pollution legislation were a cake
recipe. Yet, changing the relative stringency of NOxand SO2
caps need not affect air quality, because the two pollutants
have very similar effects, and the Clean Air Act already com-
pels states to limit emissions to meet air quality standards. A
better policy would be to authorize epa to give permits to
emit NOxin exchange for permits to emit SO2, and vice versa.
Firms would willingly conduct such trades whenever the
emissions permits they receive are more valuable. Environ-
mentalists and epashould also welcome such trades as long
as the exchange rate is set so that expected environmental
damages do not rise. Congress, therefore, should allow the
mix of NOxand SO2to vary with
market conditions and avoid pre-
scribing specific national limits
for the two similar pollutants.
Finally, Congress should
authorize firms to trade permits
to emit mercury. A national mar-
ket for mercury emissions per-
mits makes sense because signif-
icant local public health risks are
not linked to mercury emissions
from specific sources. Congress
should also authorize epa to 
sell mercury emissions permits 
at a prescribed price — such as
$20,000 per pound — to reduce
the risk of unduly high mercury
control costs. 
ENDING NSR AND OTHER
REDUNDANCIES
New Source Review would no
longer have any rationale in
facilities covered by the new
emissions caps. Congress should
exempt such facilities from the byzantine rules of the pro-
gram, as defined by 704 pages in the Code of Federal Regula-
tionsand 513 separate epapolicy and guidance documents.
Moreover, the compexity of the program demands legisla-
tive action, not reversible administrative reforms. Law-
makers also should exempt other emission sources, like
pulp and paper mills, from nsr requirements if they vol-
unteer to be covered by the emissions cap.
The cap and permit-trading system would also make
unnecessary the regulation that epacurrently is drafting to
limit mercury emissions from power plants. That regula-
tion is likely to be relatively burdensome because of the
approach prescribed by the Clean Air Act. New legislation
should direct epa not to pursue new mercury regulations.
The government can rationalize air pollution regulations
by enacting new caps on power plant emissions. Economics
are important in setting the stringency of the emissions caps,
designing permit trading systems, and eliminating redundant
regulations. Congress should pay more attention to basic eco-
nomics to ensure that the new legislation makes sense. R
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